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Effect of Social Norm on Consumer Demand:
Multiple Constraint Approach*
Sungjee Choi**
Inwoo Nam***
Jaehwan Kim****

The goal of the study is to understand the role of social norm in purchase decisions where demand
is revealed in the form of multiple-discreteness. Consumers are socially engaged in various activities
through the expectation from others in their community. Actions or decisions are likely to reflect
this influence. This implicit or explicit social norm is revealed as the rules, regulations, and standards
that are understood, shared, endorsed, and expected by group members. When consumers’ decisions
are in distance from the norm, they come to face discomfort such as shame, guilt, embarrassment,
and anxiety. These pressure act as a constraint as opposed to utility in their decision making.
In this study, the effect of social norms on consumer demand is captured via multiple constraint
model where constraints are not only from budget equation but also from psychological burden
induced by the deviation from the norm. The posterior distributions of model parameters were
estimated via conjoint study allowing for heterogeneity via hierarchical Bayesian framework. Individual
characteristics such as age, gender and work experience are also used as covariates for capturing
the observed heterogeneity. The empirical results show the role of social norm as constraint in
consumers’ utility maximization. The proposed model accounting for social constraint outperforms
the standard budget constraint-only model in terms of model fit. It is found that people with longer
job experience tend to be more robust and resistant to the deviation from the norm. Incorporating
social norm into the utility model allows for another means to disentangle the reason for no-purchase
as ‘not preferred’ and ‘not able to buy’.
Keywords: Social norms, Constraint, Choice model, Multiple discreteness, Bayesian estimation
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Ⅰ. Introduction

studies documented the existence of these
non-monetary constraints including mental
constraints (Kim et al. 2017), storage constraints

Social norm is a set of specific behavioral

(Satomura et al. 2011) and so on.

patterns that are shared and accepted within a

The observed demand in the market place

group in a particular situation. Human beings

are attributed to both consumers’ preference

are essentially social beings and, in most cases,

and constraint. Therefore, in economic theory,

they are sensitive to social influence. As the

zero-purchase is due to ‘not preferred enough’,

behavior of others often acts as a guide to their

‘not able to tolerate the cost’, or both. The

own behavior (Gockeritz et al. 2010, Brewer

burden induced by the deviation from social

and Hewstone 2004), they are often observed

norm is naturally akin to cost side. Therefore,

to be subject to social norms in their purchase

the proper approach to quantify the effect of

decision as well. For example, an individual

social norm on demand is to allow this pressure

who originally prefers bright pink suits and

to enter as a cost component in consumers’

yellow pants may hesitate to purchase them

utility maximizing decision.

when she is aware of possible negative reactions

Suppose that sales of a red car are very low

from peers or parents. So the pressure can

in a given market area, specific customer

alter her final choice to one not predicted by

segment. This may be due to the low preference

her original preference.

for red car, i.e., the buyers in this segment like

In this study, we measure the effect of social

red less than black, or higher pressure associated

pressure driven by the deviation from norms

with buying red car, i.e., peer effect on color

on demand when consumers are constrained

choice. When low or zero demand is observed

utility maximizers. Consumers trade off the

in the market, therefore, it is critical to empirically

comfort in their mind and the level of maximum

measure whether the low sales is from lower

attainable utility, implying that social norm

preference or higher social burden in more

enters decision as constraint rather than utility.

structured manner. For this purpose, we use

What consumers must give up for acquiring

direct utility model approach with multiple

goods they prefer is defined as constraint which

constraint specification. Direct utility framework

is mostly represented by budget constraint in

has been widely applied in literature to flexibly

the literature. There are quite a few examples

capture the demand in both corner and interior

that consumer demand is also influenced by

solutions(e.g., Kim et al. 2002; Bhat 2005,

other constraints and restrictions, which are

2008; Lee et al. 2013; Luo et al. 2013; Lin et

nothing to do with monetary budget. Previous

al. 2013). The model specification allows for
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separating the cost effect from the utility effect

from college health care marketing to individuals

in consumer demand. We incorporate social

volunteering decisions in literature. Haines and

norm into the model specification as additional

Spear (1996) demonstrated that ‘social norms

constraint(e.g. Satomura et al 2011, Kim et al

marketing’ is of help to lower alcohol consumption

2017). We let the marginal utility be also

on campus. Similarly, social norm marketing is

function of the product attributes so that one

an effective tool to change children’s perceptions

can still capture the utility change due to product

of tobacco usage (Sheikh et al. 2017). Harries

attributes. We also empirically investigate how

et al. (2013) reported that people reduce electricity

individual characteristics (age, gender and work

consumption more when they receive information

experience) are related to preference for product

about others’ consumption than when they got

offerings when consumers do consider social

their own consumption record.

norm in their constrained utility maximization.

Not only consumption decisions, but also non-

The remainder of the paper is organized as

purchase/acquisition decisions were associated

follows: In section 2, conceptual background

with the social norm, including moral judgement,

for the study including the definition of social

donation, boycott, etc. Fisher and Ackerman

norms is given. We show model specification,

(1998) found that social norms appeal to

likelihood, and heterogeneity in section 3. In

individuals’ volunteering decision. Sen et al.

section 4, we discuss the data and estimation

(2001) showed peoples’ participation rate on

results. Then we explore two managerial

boycott depends on their personality toward

implications from our study in section 5 and we

the society.

offer concluding remarks with opportunities for

These studies in literature give an immediate
intuition to marketing area that consumers’

future study in section 5.

purchase decisions are largely influenced by
other people. Many studies in marketing literature

Ⅱ. Conceptual Background

also dealt with the social interactions, covering
‘word of mouth (WOM)’, ‘peer influence’,
‘contagious group’, etc.

2.1 Literature

Despite the advances made to date, the results
reported in literature are based on mixed usage

Not to mention Ajzen and Fishbein(1973),

in terms of the aspect of the social norm itself

the role of social norm and its effect on our

as a construct and the level of behavior set to

behavior has been well documented in previous

be affected by norm. For example, norms can

studies. The applications are various ranging

be formal and informal. Or some are inductive

Effect of Social Norm on Consumer Demand: Multiple Constraint Approach 43

and some are descriptive. It may merely set an
expectation that members change the attitude,

2.2 Conceptual Framework of Social
Norm

or require a specific level of adjustment for
revealed behavior. Some norms are originally

Social norm is a set of specific behavioral

formed with specific intention such as code of

patterns that are shared and accepted within a

conduct imposed by an organization. In contrast,

social group in a particular situation. Often it is

other types of norms are naturally developed

also defined as attitudes and behaviors that are

in the market place, e.g., a salient consumption

expected and required by society in specific

trend that gives rise to dominating repattern

situations (Baron et al. 1992, Leon et al. 1950).

as more people comes to market via imitation.

The framework for conceptualizing the social

Therefore, we first clarify the scope of the

norm adopted in this study is based on two

social norm used in this study in order to

criteria – one is form of the requirement that

investigate its role in demand formation. In

originates from the norm, and the other is the

next sections, we elaborate more about the

level to which individuals are to conform. The

scope of social norm used in the study and

framework is described in figure 1, which also

basic quantitative specification for how the

comes from refining Paluck and Ball (2010).

social norm enters in their decision making.

The first criterion, form, is about whether the

The premise is that social norm influences

social norm imposes explicit/formal requirement

individuals’ demand through the psychological

or it is given to individuals as implicit/informal

burden associated with buying goods.

expectation that members had better conform
to. The difference between the two forms is
the type of punishment one would receive as

<Figure 1> Framework of social norms

Form presented to individuals
Expectation
(implicit/informal)

Requirement
(explicit/formal)

Behavior
(revealed)

A*

B

Attitude
(not revealed)

C

D

Level of adjustment

* used in the current study
44 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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a consequence of the violation. Norms formally

reason is that we analyze individuals’ decision

required of the members are often associated

when they recognize an implicit norm(A), rather

with practical punishment such as a demotion

than a stated formal rule(B and D). In ‘A’,

at work, getting bad grade in a class, or legal

discrepancy from the norm gives a discomfort

punishment. On the other hand, failure to meet

although it does not necessarily incur the

the expected social norm brings about implicit

formal punishment. In this study, the choice of

punishment such as sense of guiltiness and

business wear at work place is used as buyers’

other people's negative gaze.

decision variables, which will be described in

The second criterion is as to whether the

more detail in the empirical analysis section.

adjustment to be made is via consumers’

What ultimately matters in consumers’ final

behavior or at the attitude level. The difference

decision would not be social norm itself. Instead,

between behavior and attitude is that one is

it is their pressure due to the gap between

revealed and the other is not. Attitude is related

intended decision and the one that is socially

to mind and thinking, so it is not revealed and

desirable. For example, I plan to purchase a

unobservable in the market. Examples are

red & luxurious car, but it’s way different from

having generosity to the people who are in

my significant others’ thoughts. Although I

need, having respect to retired veteran, etc. In

don’t have any formal obligation to follow their

contrast, behavior is directly observable in most

expectation, I may avoid the red color and

cases. Refraining self from buying a car with

adjust to downgrading of the car in the end.

specific color, not speaking loudly in public

This distance between the desirable point

place, and so on are the examples for the level

imposed by social norm and the actual point

at which social norm interferes the behavior.

obtained from actual product choice enters as

As the results, there are four types of social

cost or expense that individuals have to take

norms – behaviors expected(A) or required(B),

as they maximize the utility from purchase.

and attitudes one think the society to expect

Kreps (1997) mentioned that social norms

to possess(C) or to require to hold(D). Among

constrain people’s behavior, and it can be

the four combinations, we focus on the first

studied in the utility maximization framework.

case in which consumers consider whether

Paluck and Ball (2010) argued that social norms

their behaviors are consistent with the social

act as a powerful constraint on individual

expectations (i.e., A). It is because the focus

attitudes and behaviors. In next section, therefore,

of the study is behavior rather than attitude,

we model the role of social norm as an additional

and we use observed data on consumer’s choice/

source of constraint, separating from the

quantity decision in empirical analysis. Another

existing budget constraint.

Effect of Social Norm on Consumer Demand: Multiple Constraint Approach 45

The total expenditure over N items (∑    )

Ⅲ. Model

cannot exceed   , the consumer k’s maximum
budget. The second constraint in (2) is about

3.1 Basic Structure

the individual’s capacity to tolerate social
pressure. Here,   is marginal social burden or

Following the discussion in 2.1 and 2.2, the

concern that one has to take for each additional

model structure is given as below. The model

quantity of good n. Both  and   are

can deal with an arbitrary number of products

observed from data. If an individual feels that

and type of demand, i.e., discrete or continuous,

the consuming good n is uncomfortable against

and it is based on the utility maximization

her social norm,   is large to her. Similar

with double constraints employed in literature
(e.g., Satomura et al. 2011):

to budget constraint, ∑     is a total
inconvenience from consuming goods in the
category, and it does not exceed   , the

max U( )
subject to ∑          (1)
∑            

(2)

individual k’s psychological capability to tolerate
the discomfort. One assumption of the model is
that consumers do not exhaust their budgetary
allotment nor their psychological capacity. So

where

  and   are outside goods for budget and

k : individual k (k=1, ... , K)

social norm constraint, respectively, and both

n : good n (n=1, ... , N)

are assumed strictly positive demand.

t : time at t (t=1, ... , T)

3.2 Utility function
An individual consumer  is assumed to
make her decision on what to buy and how

For application, we use the direct utility

much to buy over N items (        )

specification for U(x) in 3.1 This framework

in the focal category, and how much to spend

can handle the simultaneous demand for

on outside goods (  ). An arbitrary utility

varieties allowing for both corner and interior

function U(x) is maximized subject to budget

solution.

constraint in (1) and social norms constraint
U( ) = ∑    log   

in (2):
In the budget constraint, there is  , the
price of item n, and  , the quantity demanded.
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   log       log   

(3)

The utility is expressed log-linearly to

that combines the utility function in (3) with

capture the diminishing returns to marginal

Lagrangian multipliers (    ) for each of

utility, which allows for interior solutions.

the constraints:

Parameter  is the baseline utility of good

n for individual k at time t. Two outside goods

          ∑        
     ∑ 
           .

are also added,  and  from constraints
in (1) and (2), respectively. Thus the marginal
utility parameters for both outside goods are

We assume the outside goods are strictly

fixed to 1 for identification purpose, i.e.,  =

positive values, so the two constraints are

1,  =1. The translation by “+1” in ( + 1)

always binding, indicating that  and 

assures the existence of corner solution so that

are positive. By rewriting the expressions for

the marginal utility at  = 0 is finite.

complementary slackness, we have following

We relate baseline preference parameter for
good n to the vector of its product attribute
(  ). The randomness(  ) enters the
marginal utility via  parameter, and is
assumed to Type I extreme value distributed:

      ∑      

with the first-order conditions of the observed
demand:

  ․ 
 ․  

=  － －

 
   
 
 

= 0, and  > 0

   exp     ,
 ~ i.i.d EV(0,1)

stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated

(4)
(5)

where  is the  attribute of good n and 
is the corresponding coefficient.

3.3 Likelihood

(6)


  ․ 
 ․  

=  － －

   
 
 
 

< 0, and  = 0

(7)

Taking logarithms of (6) and (7), we have:
 =  

if  > 0

(8)



if  = 0

(9)

<  

where
The likelihood for the observed demand from
the constrained utility maximization is derived
by forming a Lagrangian equation for the
optimality condition and incorporating the

 =  + log(    ) +
 ․ 

 ․  

log( 
+
)
  ∑     
  ∑    

(10)

statistical distribution over the random terms
(  ’s). First, we form an auxiliary equation

The distributional property of  in KT
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equalities and inequalities in (8) and (9) gives

3.4 Heterogeneity

rise to the statistical likelihood for any type of
observed demand at a time t in closed form.

The parameters in the likelihood in (11) are

Suppose that R goods are purchased out of

individual-specific, and they are all estimated

total N goods and the data points are rearranged

with heterogeneity across people in the data.

in the order that non-zero demand(x > 0)

The vector of parameters for consumer k,  

comes first and no-purchase(x = 0) comes

in the estimation is:

later. Then, the likelihood for the observed
demand ( ) is:

   ′  ′      ′



where    ln    and    ln    to assure

     and    

the positivity of the resource parameters, i.e.,

    and       
 



 



∞



0 <   ,   . We relate these model parameters

    

to each individual characteristic for capturing

∞

the observed heterogeneity, and assume the

     





 

 

exp  





∙ exp 

exp 



unobserved heterogeneity component to be
normally distributed as given in (13):



(11)

  = ∆′  +  ,  ~ N(0,   )

(13)

In this likelihood, the KT equalities for non-

where   is the vector of consumer k’s

zero demand in (8) requires the density

individual-level covariates, ∆ is the coefficient

evaluation of   ․  and KT inequalities for zero

matrix measuring the relationship between z

demand in (9) are expressed as probability

and  , and   is the covariance matrix

mass. The term |  | is the RxR Jacobian

reflecting the unobserved heterogeneity.

for interior solutions mapping random-utility
error( ) to the observed data( ) :

Ⅳ. Empirical Analysis


  
  
․    ․  

   

(12)

where  = 1 if    , and  = 0 otherwise.
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4.1 Data Description
The data used in the analysis were about

choice of shirts that people would wear at

Among the profiles used in the study, the

work, and collected by choice-based conjoint

product with (a1=0, a2=0), i.e., white shirts

survey in South Korea. Wearing shirts at work

(a1=0) with no pattern(a2=0) is the one

has been mostly expected for a long time. In

conforming to the norm descried in the scenario.

the study, participants were told a scenario that:

The prices( ) and the order of the shirts
were changed across choice tasks. At the end

their workplaces have a bylaw to wear a suit,
there is no mandatory guideline for color or
pattern of the shirts; most of their colleagues at
work usually wear white shirts with no pattern.

of the session, participants were asked about
the inconvenience they may have with each
shirt(  ) if they wore it. Three variables(z1,
z2, z3) were recorded for individual characteristics

Then participants had ten choice tasks. At

including age (z1), gender (z2 = 0 if female, 1

each task, they were instructed to show what

otherwise), and work experience (z3 = 1 if

and how many to purchase among eight varieties

experience, 0 otherwise) for each of the total

of shirts without any restriction on their choice

104 individuals. The average age of the

whether it is to be corner or interior solution.

participants was 25.6. Total 68(36) respondents

Product attributes and varieties used in data

were female(male) and those who replied they

collection were given in table 1 (a) and (b).

had work experience was 56.

<Table 1> Product offerings and attributes
(a) Attributes coding
Attribute
Color

Coding

a1

White

0

Non-white

1

Pattern

a2

No

0

Yes

1

(b) Varieties and attribute combinations
Variety
(n)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Color

White

White

White

Blue

Pink

Blue

Blue

Mixed

Pattern

None

Striped

Dotted

Striped

None

None

None

Checked
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<Table 2> Purchase incidence, quantity, and type of purchase
Variety
(n)

Purchase
incidence

Purchase
quantity

Single item purchase
(Corner Solution)

Multiple items purchase
(Interior Solution)

Interior Solution
Proportion

1

820

2092

96

724

0.88

2

301

376

6

295

0.98

3

176

255

0

176

1.00

4

253

315

4

249

0.98

5

240

331

1

239

0.99

6

398

540

14

384

0.96

7

510

745

3

507

0.99

8

81

105

2

79

0.98

Total

2779

4759

126

2653

0.95

Table 2 provides the overall purchase pattern

Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods in hierarchical

observed in our data. Participants purchased

Bayesian framework. The recursive sampling

variety #1 the most (820 times) whereas they

scheme is:

chose #8 the least (81 times). As the mean
proportion of the interior solution is 95 %,

  | ∆ ,   ,   ,   for k=1, …, K

respondents chose multiple shirts at a time for

∆ | {   , k=1, …, K},   ,  

their use at work. We will explore whether the

  | {   , k=1, …, K}, ∆ ,  

observed differences among varieties in table 2
is from preference difference or something

Metropolis-Hastings random work chain was

else such as psychological burden due to not

used for obtaining posterior distribution of

conforming to the implicit social norm in our

individual parameters,   for all k. Standard

data. So we first check the model fit and

Gibbs sampler was used for estimating ∆

discuss parameter estimates in next section,
and later we quantify the effect of social burden
in comparison with the effect of price cut on
consumer welfare.

posterior) with diffuse priors. Every 10th draw
out of total 40,000 iterations were retained to
control autocorrelations, and last 15,000 iterations
after burn-in were used for producing posterior

4.2 Estimation Results

summary. The detailed estimation outcome is

The joint posterior distribution of the model
parameters was estimated via Markov chain
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available from authors upon request.

the proposed model outperforms the budget

4.2.1 Model Fit

constraint-only model, implying that the observed
We first check whether consumers’ responses

demand reflects the role of social norm as

reflect the effect of social norm as another

additional constraint. In next section, therefore,

source of burden in addition to monetary

we discuss the parameters estimates focusing

constraint in the current data. For this purpose,

on the proposed model first, and explore the

we fit an alternative model as a benchmark

possible bias when one fails to ignore the social

consists of the same utility specification in (3)

constraint.

but without social norm constraint in (2), i.e.,
<Table 3> Model fit comparison


max U( )∑     log   
  log   

subject to ∑          (14)
In table 3, log marginal densities for the

Model

Log-marginal density

Benchmark

-6343.69

Proposed

-5825.04

4.2.2 Parameter Estimates

benchmark model and proposed models are
reported. The model fit comparison shows that

Posterior mean and standard deviation for the

<Table 4> Posterior mean of coefficient(∆′ ) and unobserved heterogeneity( )
Intercept

Age

Gender

Work experience

Heterogeneity (  )



0.081

-0.059

-0.022

0.371

2.412



-0.211

-0.029

-0.089

0.164

1.438



-0.504

-0.020

0.267

0.333

1.390



-0.011

0.024

-0.215

-0.099

1.107



-0.426

-0.015

-0.400

0.378

1.381



-0.170

-0.007

0.507

-0.013

0.039



0.025

-0.024

-0.043

-0.031

1.393



-0.341

-0.002

0.393

-0.040

1.084



-0.867

-0.014

0.112

0.272

1.504



-1.060

-0.011

0.065

0.155

1.307



5.790

0.004

0.046

0.175

0.425



1.293

-0.032

0.503

0.756

2.113

Note. Estimates where 95% credible region does not include zero are in bold.
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parameters and hyper parameters are reported

social norm-constraint despite the presence of

in table 4. First, the utility effects of non-white

multiple constraint in the demand? In order to

color(a1=1) and being patterned (a2=1) are

address this question, we compare the parameter

negative as   < 0 and   < 0. In the data,

estimates between the proposed model and the

respondents’ preference for shirt is lowered if

single constraint model in (14).

there’s any pattern in the shirt or the color is
non-white. Relative to the first shirt(   ),
the intercept in baseline preference for rest

<Table 5> Comparison in utility parameters
Proposed
Model

Benchmark
Model




0.08

-0.10




-1.28

-2.04




-1.57

-2.44




-1.95

-2.96




-1.30

-2.15

across consumers. These individual-level parameters




-1.05

-1.79

are not significantly related to consumers’




-0.85

-1.36

demographic variables such as age(z1) and




-2.28

-3.52

gender(z2). It is notable, however, that the




-0.87

-1.42




-1.07

-1.65

Parameter

of the shirts are low. Secondly, the log of
budget limit(M*) and psychological capacity(S*)
parameters are estimated to be on average
5.970 and 1.293, respectively.
From the diagonal elements of     , there’s
substantial amount of heterogeneity in parameters

*

relationship between S and work-experience(z3)

Baseline
Preference

Attribute
effect

is significant (0.756). Those who have work
experience tend to have larger psychological
capacity to handle the social pressure. A more
detailed discussion for parameter estimates is
given in the next section via the comparison
across the budget constraint model.

In table 5, we report the mean of baseline
preference for each of the shirt varieties( 
 ,


... , 
  ) and the mean of preference impact of
attributes( 
 , 
  ) after integrating across
individuals and over the data for each model.

4.2.3 Bias in utility parameters due to
ignoring the social constraint

First, the baseline parameters from the bench
mark model are systematically lower than
those of the proposed model, indicating there’s

What would be the bias when social constraint

downward bias in the preference when ignoring

is not considered in the model? How would

the role of additional constraint. In the benchmark

marketers’ understanding on consumer preference

model with budget constraint only, the effect

would be biased when they ignore the role of

of social constraint is absorbed by the preference,
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 ): Model Comparison
<Figure 2> Parameter Estimates( 

which would eventually lower the preference

Ⅴ. Managerial Implication

parameter estimates. Figure 2 shows the amount
and the pattern of bias. The first shirts (x1)
having attribute combination(a1=0, a2=0)

The estimation results show that the observed

close to social norm shows the least difference

demand is more consistent with the multiple

in baseline preference estimates.

constraint model, indicating the meaningful

This bias is also observed in the attribute
impact parameters. The estimates of ( 
 , 
 )

role of social norm in consumer decisions on shirt

is (-0.873 -1.066) for proposed model and

contributes to demand for a product are social

(-1.418 -1.645) for benchmarks. Although

burden, monetary constraint, and consumer’s

consumers do not prefer anyway having colored

preference. Thus, marketers need to know

and patterned shirt relative to white and

whether or not it’s worthwhile to pay attention

non-patterned shirt, benchmark model overly

to the information about social burden more

states this low preference. It is because any

than to preference estimates or to price constraint.

lower demand in the data is to be attributed to

From now on, we discuss managerial implication

consumers’ preference only in benchmark model

of the proposed model from marketer’s view

whereas the proposed multiple constraint model

point.





choice. Three components in the model that

separates the high pressure from low preference,
resulting in the preference parameter estimates
not as low as single constraint model depicts.
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5.1 Social norm versus preference as
a sales predictor

and social burden ratio(  ). Without loss of
generality, we fix the first shirt as a reference
good and calculate the following quantities

In figure 3, the coordinates for each of the
eight shirts used in the data are given based
on the mean preference and social burden, i.e.,
(
 ,  ) for n =1,..,8. The plot reveals a




pattern that the amount of social burden and
the estimated preference are negatively correlated.
Products with high(low) preference appear
low(high) in social burden. Thus, marketers
need to know which one is more compelling
reason to make people buy(not buy) the product
- high(low) preference or low(high) social
burden.
To address this question, we calculate the
values of the relative sales among products
and check whether these numbers are closer to
or consistent with the preference ratio(  )

relative to this reference for the rest of shirts
(n=2, ... , 8):
 
Sales ration = 
 

Preference ration = 


The pattern of these indices are given in
figure 4. In order to make the directions
comparable among indices, social burden ratio
is given in inverse form. From the plot, it is
obvious that relative ratio of social burden

 


between products  is much more informative


<Figure 3> Social burden( ) and baseline preference( ) for products
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Social burden ration = 


<Figure 4> Sales ratio, preference ratio and social burden ratio (reference good: alternative 1)

about product sales than is the preference

 


ratio  .


model parameters.

   = ∑   ∑           

5.2 Consumer welfare impact of social
norm versus price discount

Then, we explore the changes in this aggregated
welfare as we relieve one constraint by stepwise
discount while holding the other constraint

In this part, we compare the policy impact

unchanged. For simple evaluation, we use five

on maximum attainable utility between social

grids - 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40% for each

cost and monetary cost. Product presented

computation.

with either price reduction or lowered social
burden is an attractive option to a consumer,
and it would increase the indirect utility. Then,
which policy has stronger impact on the welfare
change? We quantify the effect by evaluating
the changes in indirect utility as marketers
offer price cut or reduction in social cost.


    ∑  ∑            ․   

for   = .05, .10, .20, .30, .40

    ∑  ∑         ․      

for   = .05, .10, .20, .30, .40

For counterfactuals, we first evaluate the
indirect utility using the posterior draws of the

where   and   are discount depth for
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social burden( ) and price ( ), respectively.

(  =.10) increases the maximum attainable

The impact from each of the policy change

    
   
was computed as 
.

  

utility by 4 % while the same percent of price
1.22%. This differential impact is held across

Table 6 shows how much the consumer

all five policies. As reported in the last column

welfare changes for each policy change and

in table 6, on average, the welfare effect of

the relative strength of the impact between

norm is three times bigger than price cut.

reduction((  =.10)) increases the welfare by

the two policies. We find that the consumers’

Figure 5 shows these results more intuitively.

benefit from relieving social norm is higher

As discount increases, the difference between

than the impact from price cut. For instance,

the two policies becomes larger. From marketers’

10% reduction from the current social cost

perspective, any marketing programs from

<Table 6> Welfare impact: reduction in price vs social pressure
Price discount
(A)

Reduction in
psychological burden(B)

Ratio
(B/A)

5% reduction

0.58%

1.83%

3.13

10% reduction

1.22%

4.00%

3.23

20% reduction

2.48%

8.63%

3.45

30% reduction

4.03%

14.08%

3.45

40% reduction

5.76%

20.81%

3.57

<Figure 5> Welfare change from price discount and reduction in social burden
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product configuration to promotional communication

region for non-zero demand. Therefore, low

that offers even small changes in consumer

demand or no-purchase for any good can come

conformity to social norm can be as good as a

from not only lower preference but also from

large price discount. For example, a 30% price

higher cost associated with constraint consumers

discount shows the similar result with 10%

have. The model was applied to conjoint data

social burden reduction, i.e., about 4.0 % welfare

from office workers’ choice of shirts at work place.

impact.

Key findings from the empirical analysis are
as follow. First, the proposed model with social
constraint fits better than the benchmark model

Ⅵ. Concluding Remarks

with budget constraint, which supports that
the effect of social norm is not trivial even
after accounting for preference effect. Second,

A consistent body of research in social science

the estimates for preference parameters suffer

area has shown that human behavior is affected

from downward bias when ignoring social norm

by the social environment. Individuals make

in model specification. Third, both preference

their own decisions, yet their behavior often

and norm-related parameters turn out to be

reflect the influences from these external force

substantially heterogeneous across individuals,

in a wide range including eating, wearing,

but such variation was not related to individuals’

learning, talking, and so on. Buying and

age and gender. Fourth, work experience variable

consuming in market places are not exempt

- one of the individual covariates, is positively

from this influence as a consumer is also one

related to individuals’ psychological capacity

of the entities to go through social interaction.

parameter that enables consumers to tolerate

Social norms set an expectation on consumer

pressures from social norm.

purchase decision.

The study also offers contributions to marketers.

The goal of this study is to model the role of

First, practitioners in the field need to have

social norm in consumer demand where purchase

good outlook for the variation in their marketing

decisions are not buying single-item-only, but

performances. Unlike common belief that

can be multiple-item-buying as well. Based

consumer preference or its relative strength to

on economic utility framework, we allow for

competitors determines the sales performance

social norm to influence demand as additional

in the market, the sales of the shirts were a lot

constraint in consumers’ utility maximizing

more consistent with the level of conformity to

decision. The presence of additional constraint

social norms associated with each shirt. Secondly,

in consumer decision making restricts the feasible

in an effort to search for tools and programs to
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shift consumer welfare, this study provides an

including the positive role of job experience in

important intuition to policy decision makers.

making consumers relatively robust to social

It is that working on programs that mitigates

norm. Asia is still a growing market, and this

the consumer’s concern from social norm is in

market is known to be more sensitive toward

fact very effective and the calculated effect on

the social norms, other people’s gaze and

consumer welfare is about three times bigger

evaluation. Identifying variables responsible

than promotional price cut.

for high and low sensitivity to norm will certainly

There are several interesting avenues for

help global companies looking for efficient

future research. First, some consumers may

targeting and market segmentation-base variables

have desire for uniqueness more than conformity,

tailored to Asian consumers. We leave these

although most people perceive discomfort when

topics for future research.

they are away from social norm. We think

<Received February 2. 2020>

that the uniqueness versus conformity is not

<Accepted March 31. 2020>

the constructs lying on the same dimension
with different position, but they are more of
multi-dimensional. In this study, we allow for
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